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Abstract 
This paper takes a game-theoretic approach to the analysis of the spending-votes 
relationship in Congressional elections to reinvestigate the surprisingly weak effects of 
incumbent spending nwasurPd in previous studies. Rather than focusing narrowly on the 
impact of spending on e!f'ctoral outcomes, we attempt to take account of the reciprocal 
effect of (anticipated) closeness on spending using several statistical approaches. \Ve also
offer improvements in the specification and measmement of the vote equation, by using 
a better measure of district party strength adjusted for year-effects, and by including 
a variable that measures the heat of the campaign in terms of total spending by the 
incumbents and challengers. The latter measure partially corrects for the simultane­
ously determined (and highly positively correlated) levels of incumbent and challenger 
spending. A more rigorous multiequation simultaneous equations model, identified by 
uncorrelated errors. provides even more leverage for sorting out the effects of incumbent 
and challenger spending on votes. That analysis indicates (in a. complete turnaround
from findings report<>d <>lsewhere) that incumbent spending effects a.re highly significant
and of a magnitudP that is, if anything, greater than challenger spending effects. The
pa.per concludes by using a game theoretic model to estimate the effect of anticipated 
closeness on spending. and to estimate differences in campaign financing costs between 
incumbents and challengf'rs. 
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THE SPENDING GAME: MONEY, VOTES, AND 
INCUMBENCY IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONst* 
Robert S. Erikson Thomas R. Palfrey 
Introduction 
It is commonly believed that the increased cost of congressional campaigning has cor­
rupted congressional politics. Some of the argument goes roughly like this: Candidates 
must spend lavishly to win over congressional voters. Hustling the n ecessary cash from 
contributors in return for access, incumbents a.re genera.By able to outspend any chal­
lenger that might threaten them. Tlrns, they almost always win reelection. Awa.re that 
incumbents a.re protected by their ca.sh advantage, potentia.l opponents rarely offer more 
than token challenges. This process perpetuates a system >vhereby most congressional 
races are not seriously contested. 
Although the forgoing argument has a familiar resonance, it is by no means the 
consensus position within political science. ·while political scientists generally express 
concern about the role of money in politics and about the incumbency advantage, they 
are n ot agreed that. the problem of money and the problem of incumbency are connected 
in the simple manner we have described. Instead, one finds a. prevailing political science 
orthodoxy to the efft>et that incumbents accrue their advantage "free" from the visibility 
of their performance, with litt.le added gain from their campaign spending. Challengers, 
on the other hand. can gain t.llf' necessary visibility only by spending, but only rarely a.re 
able to spend enough to wi11. 
The reason why incurnlwnt. spending is not held to be very important in congressional 
elect ions is trfl.at. fwholil l'B Im v�-nGt·�)eefl· ttJ1le t-0·1n10ve··eon·viacingly .. i ts -st-at:istical contri bu­
t ion. The initia.l findings in this regard are infamous. Performing OLS regression on the 
district vote presents tlw odd result that while challenger spending matters, incumbent 
spending does not. As first shown by Gary .Jacobson (1978, 1980, 1985) in his pioneering
work on the elect.oral effects of campaign spending, challenger spending shows a positive 
effect on the challenger's rnt.e margin; but the coefficient for incumbent spending either 
shows up as quite weak, near zero, or even with the wrong sign. 
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A n  obvious possibil ity, recognized by Jacobson a.nd subsequent observers, is that the 
OLS findings are biased due to the reciprocal nature of the relationship between spending 
and the vote. Candidate spending decisions are a function of the perceived vote margin ,  
with candidates spend ing more when the election gets close. As challengers see their 
chances i mprove, they spend more. Thus,  to the extent that the underlying source of 
a challenger's better chances i s  not perfectly observable, the relat ionship between the 
challenger vote and challenger spending is biased upward,  exaggerating any challenger 
spending effect on the vote. For incumbents the bias is i n  the opposi te  direction. As 
incumbents see the challenger's chances improve, they also spend more. The relation­
ship between the incumbent vote and incumbent spending is biased downward, working 
against the hypothesis that incumbent spending garners votes . 
This s i tuat ion begs for a game-theoretic analys is  in which the spending decisions of 
the incumbent and challenger a.re simultaneously determined as equil ibrium strategies 
of a non-cooperative game. The insights of this approach to modelling the spending­
votes issue can shed l ight on the nature of the simultaneity b ias that a.rises when the 
strategic i ntera.tions betw<'en incumbent and challenger behavior a.re ignored . If success­
ful ,  these insights ca.n be used to correct for the inherent biases in pa .st findings and to 
identify more preci sely the relative importance of incumbent and challenger spend ing. 
We follow this general approach here, discussing and comparatively evaluating several 
different methodologi cal techn iques for embedding the subtle strategic impli cati ons of 
game-theoretic/equi l ibr ium analysis into statistical models for estimating the spending­
votes relationsh ip .  
One potential correction for the simultaneity bias that has been tried elsewhere (Ja­
cobson 1 985, Green and I\rasno 1 988 and 1 990,  Bartels 1 992) is to perform two-stage 
lea.st squares or some other simultaneous equa.tion technique that estimates effects when 
simultaneity bias is suspected. This requi res the exploitation of one or more instrumental 
variables that affect incumbent spending but not the vote d irectly;  and ,  similarly, one 
or more i ndependent var iablf's that affect challenger spending but not the vote directly. 
Accordingly, to correct for t he potent ial simultanei ty bias, Jacobson performed a two­
stage analysis to supplem<'lll his OLS findings. Unfortunately, the instrumental variables 
that  Jacobson found arnila ble were not strongly related to spending, thus leaving the 
statistical verdict in doubt . S t. i l l , the statisti cally weak 2SLS result was similar to the 
OLS verdict-a s t rong spending effect for challengers but not for incumbents. 
From the triangulat ion of his OLS and 2SLS est imates . .Jacobson concludes cautiously
tha t  whi le incumlwnt sp<'n di ng probably matters somewhat, it matters dec idedly less 
than challenger .spe11diJ1g�- - .J a.wbso+1 's.-1.:at.i.ona.le ... fQr . .tfa.i s-i�Gtenua.Uy--d.i-ssonant result is
that incumbents al r<'ady <·1 1 joy an advantage in recogni tion and voter approval before 
spending starts .  Chal 1C' 1 1gf'rs 1wed to spend to catch up .  But incumbent visibil i ty readily 
approaches a cei li ng. beyond which more spend ing would attract few additional voters 
(Jacobson , 1 978, 1982. 1985. Hl90 ) .  
If incumbent spending ma t ters less than challenger spending, this a.symmetry carries 
important implications regarding the consequences of potential reforms.  In particular ,  
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any suggestion of spending limits ( for example, as part of public financing of campaigns) 
brings the charge that the scheme would only offer further electoral protection to in­
cumbents (Jacobson, 1 985) .  The charge is  that any plausible spending l imit would stifle 
potent ially winnable challenges from achieving their potential, while offering l itt le d is­
cern ible handicap to the already advantaged incumbents .  
Jacobson's thesis of l imited incumbent spending effects has attracted spiri ted chal­
lengers , most notably Green and Krasno ( 1988, 1 990) .  Green and K rasno find different 
results using lagged incumbent spending as an instrument for current incumbent spend­
i ng.  The justification is  tha.t lagged spending, under earl ier cam paign condi tions, reflects 
the i ncumbent 's "propensi ty to spend." \�i th lagged spending as an instrument for in­
cumbent spending, Green and Krasno's 2SLS estimates triumphantly show effects for 
incumbent spending that rival i n  magnitude those for challenger spending. In response, 
Green and Krasno's methodology has drawn vigorous cri tiques from Jacobson ( 1990 )  and 
from A bramowitz ( 1991 ) .  The proper statist ical verdict regarding the role of i ncumbent 
spending in congressional elections hardly seems settled. 
Apart from strictly stati stical considerations, let us mull the theoretical plausi bly 
of the two different scenarios-one where the effect of challenger spending dominates 
and the other where incumbent spending matters perhaps as much as if not more than 
challenger spending. As part of our deliberations, let us examine the plausibil ity of the 
two arguments in terms of wha.t we know about voters, about candidates, and about 
campaign spending decisions. 
First ,  does our knowledge of the electorate reveal why campaign spending should be 
particularly ineffect ive if cond ucted by incumbent House members? Jacobson's argument 
i s  that spendi ng adds li ttle to the voters' already rich storehouse of information about 
the incumbent. Yet according to well-known survey evidence of voter i nforma.tion ( e .g. , 
S tokes and Mi ller, 19GG ) ,  congressional incumbents are i n  fact largely invisible to their 
const ituencies and certai nly would stay that way i f  they did not campaign. Certainly 
incumbents face no ob,· ious cei l ing in terms of voter knowledge or media exposure. 
'vVe can also ask whet her a greater spending effect for cha.llengers is plausible, given 
what we know abou t t he poli tical capabi l i t ies of challengers a.nd incumbents. If one ga.ve 
the average incu mbent and tl 1e average cha.l lenger each say $100 ,000 to spend, who could 
win the most votes wi th their new money? According to a wealth of evidence ( Jacobson , 
1 989 ) ,  the pool of congress ional challengers is weak and get.t ing weaker; l\foanwhile, 
incumbents show their capabi l i ty by getting elected i n  the first place. One can easi ly 
imagine that with 1-1 . .  re.pu t.c<l poliiicaLexpe.rtise.fa.r..gi:ea.ter..tha.n.that. of .theiroft.en amateur 
competit ion , i 11 cumlw1 1t s ough t to be able to spend their money more-rather than less­
efficiently than challf' 1 1gf'rs . 
Finally, consider the spending behavior of challengers and incumbents. Suppose that 
i ncumbent spending trnly does not matter. Then , the obvious question i s  why do incum­
bents spend at al l ,  even with ample war chests? In fact,  apart from priva.te usage ,  why 
would i ncumbents amass \\'ar chests at al l?  Not only would we need to ask why i ncum-
bents spend so much; we would also have to ask why challengers do not spen d more. If 
challengers gain votes by spending and incumbents are largely helpless at stopping them, 
why do not challengers simply spend incumbents into defeat? 
Of course there are long-standing arguments on the other side of this question to offer 
a rebuttal. First, no matter how uninformed voters are of incumbents, voter informa­
tion about challengers is even less , leading to the inference that wel l -targeted challenger 
spending could produce rapid electoral gains .  Second ,  although challengers may gen­
erally be too weak, ineffectual , or unattractive to spend effectively, it may only be the 
most qual ified challengers who a.re given the monetary resources to spend . Finally, if in­
cumbent spending truly is effective, why do not incumbents spend even more from their 
rich war chests to drown out the challenger? If the effect of incumbent spending is a.s 
strong as for challengers, i t  might seem tha.t incumbents ought to generate an even more 
lopsided incumbent advantage i n  terms of campaign spending. 
This pa.per attempts to solve this riddle of incumbent spending. Toward this end , 
this pa.per offers several un ique features: 
• We analyze congressional district election results over two decades, spanning the
years from 1972 to 1990. We pool this data. into two separate <la.ta. sets: one for the
districts of the 1970s; the other for the 1 980s . As a.n i nnovation , we util ize distri ct
presidential voting a .s a.n i nd icator of district-level part isanship i ndependent of the
congressional race.
• Uti l iz ing the perspect ive from game theory, we examine the supply side of the
money equat ion, to see how anticipated election results drive campaign spending.
This analysis of spend ing is used to develop further insights for the reverse deman d
side of spending.
• Statist ical l y, we present a new wa.y to identify the vote model-not in terms of
instruments for spending variables, wh i ch ma .y be  a . fut i le quest-but instead by
ma.k ing assu mp t ions about the covariances of the error terms. Derived from our
game theore t ical  resu l t s, we obta in  the cond i t ions when the s imultaneity bias should
be stronger and weak('!'. and est i mate the  spending effects under the d ifferent con­
d i t ions.
\Ve argue that our  l'<'<'Xarni nation of the evidence shows strong c ircu mstant ial support 
for the posit ion tha t  i n cumlwnt spending matters a.t l east a.s much a.s chal l enger spending 
i n  House elections. The reason why such evidence has been elusive, we argue, is that
the stat i sti cal strengt h of the reverse causal flow from the expected vote to spending 
levels-which i s  t lw sou rce of the m ischievous bias-has been seriously underestimated . 
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1 Open Seats: Spending Effects and the Measure­
ment of Par 
The analysis begins with an investigation of spending effects for open seats-those with 
no incumbent running. We start there for two reasons. First , since effects of spending
for open seats should be about equal for both Republican and Democratic candidates 
(neither is the incumbent), open seats should provide unbiased estimates of the potential 
effect parameters for challengers and incumbents in incumbent races. Second, we exploit 
our open seat analysis to obtain estimates of a baseline we call "Par . "  Par is the expected 
vote independent of candidate considerations-given district part isanship ( "normal vote"), 
the election year's partisan trend ( "national short term forces" ), and equal Republican 
and Democratic spending effects. 
As a reflector of district partisanship, the district- level presidential vote is the major 
component of Par .  Because the president ial vote is a. steadier predictor of district par­
tisanship ( and hence the House vote) in the North than in the South,  we restrict our 
statistical analysis to Nort hern districts, excluding both South and Border states. For 
the 1970s, the one presidentia l  vote measure that predicts the congressional vote wel l ,  
regardless of election year ,  is the Carter-Ford 1976 vote. For the 1 980s, the Duka.kis-Bush 
1988 vote serves this purpose. 
Par represents a particular baseline: the expected congressional vote, given the dis­
trict 's relevant president ia l  voting history and the election-year partisan trend , for an 
open seat where Democratic and Republican spending levels are ba.lanced. 1 Table 1 shows 
how this measure was crea t ed .  first for the 1 970s. For a.II northern open seats, 1 972- 1 980,  
we regressed the percent Democratic on the Carter 1 976 percentage, four election-year 
dummies, and the net difference between the log of Democratic spending and the log 
of Republican spending. This equation provides an open seat vote p rediction from the
combination of Par and cam paign spending. Par is the open-seat equation prediction, 
with the estimated effect of spending subtracted from it . For the 1 980s, Par is created 
similarl y, using the 1988 Democratic presidential vote. 2 
Note that the spen d i ng e ffect is modeled as a linear effect of logged spending on the 
two-party vote division .  This specification al lows the marginal effect of the next dollar to 
dimin ish with the amount  a l ready spent. By the usual criteria. of best fi tting R squared, 
lower standard error of <'SI irnate, etc . ,  logged spending outperforms raw spending as a 
vote pred ictor .  Th<' 01w sou rce of untidiness is how to adj ust the log of spending when
a candida t e  spends 1101 l i i 11g or very little. The case of '·no spending" ( the log of zero is 
minus in fi n it y)  ca n lw dc•a l t  with by assigning one dol lar of spending. Stil l ,  increments
of spending in t lw lesser range can affect the coefficients disproportionately. \\Te adopt 
Green and Krasno's ( 19!l0 ) solution,  measuring the spending variable as the log of the 
candidate's spending p lus $.5000 ( in 1 978 doll ars ) .  To maintain a. comparable monetary 
scale for different elec t ion years, we measure spending in terms of constant ( 1978) dollars . 
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Some i ntriguing side-evidence suggests that Par is a very accurate reflection of district­
to-district differences in partisanship ,  namely t hat with  Par in the equation, t he lagged 
(t-1) congressi onal vote does not even make a stat ist ically significant contribution to t he 
open-seat vote. If one knows the presidential vote ( for 1976 for the 1970s; 1988 for the 
1980s) plus  t he election year, the d istricts congressional election h istory does not help to 
predi ct the open-seat congressional vote. Evidently, a l l  relevant information about dis­
trict parti sanship is contained in Par. If Par were a leaky measure of d istrict partisansh ip ,  
partisanship would be reflected by the district 's congressional election history. 
Not to be lost in the shuffle of our d iscussion of Par are the estimated effects of spend­
ing by open seat candidates . With separate coefficients for Republican and Democrat ic  
spending,  both spending coefficients are quite statistically significant . Although the co­
efficient i s  h igher for Republican spending, we treat the two spending effects as equal for 
the measurement of Par, ut i l izi ng the net difference in logged spending. 
What should we make of the magnitude of the spending effects where the log of 
spending shows a coefficient of about 4 .0? Figure 1 is  i ntended to provide some guidance. 
Figure la shows the relationsh ip between the actual vote and Par for the 1970s. Par serves 
as a baseline ,  so where the vote is h igher than Par ,  the Democrat ic  candidate did better 
than expected; where the vote is lower than Par, the Republican candidate performed 
better than the Par baseli ne.  Note both a strong fit and that the dominant party i n  
one-party districts tended t o  outperform even Par. This latter result i s  a product of the 
dominant party 's edge in campaign spending.  
Figure 1-b shows how the relationship between Par and the projected vote with spend­
ing effects removed. ( The t erm b*Log Spending Difference is subtracted from the actual 
vote . )  \Vi thout spending churning the vote, the fit with  par i mproves slightly, with the 
spending-neutral vote mo\'i ng in the d i rect ion of Par. \Vi th  spending effects neutral ized, 
the open-seat vote tends to revert to the normal vote. 
The clearest demons! rat ion of the i mportance of spending for open seats is to show the
hypothet ical  vote i f  one part y spent v i rtually nothing .  Figure 1-c shows the projected 
vote if each Republican ca ndidate spent no more than the nominal cushion of $.5000. 
Figure 1 -d shows t h<' projec t ed vote if each DE'mocrati c  candidate spent only $5000. 
\Vi th  each nonspend ing  sc<'nar io, the nonspending party would perform worse than Par 
in  all but a handful of districts. Most nonspenders would lose. Clearly, spending money 
is requi red to beconw <1 compet i ti ve candidate for an open seat . 
2 OLS Analysis of Spending for Incumbent Seats 
When the incumbent i s  one of the candidates, the two spending variables must be chal­
lenger spending and incumbent spending rather than si mply Republican spending and 
Democrat ic  spend ing. For l'<'a.sons mentioned, OLS est imates for incumbent a.nd chal­
lenger spending are seriously biased . Sti l l ,  we present a brief demonstration of OLS 
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results using Par as a control . The usual setup for model ing the vote in incumbent races 
is to model t he challenger's vote as the dependent variable (Jacobson, 1978. 1980; Green 
and Krasno, 1988, 1990; Bartels, 1992) .  We chose to model the incumbent 's vote. Ob­
viously this makes no substantive difference, being a matter of relative convenience. We 
model t he incumbent vote because when an incumbent runs, t he vote is predictable from 
the i ncumbent's history as a vote-getter. The challenger is almost always a. fresh draw 
with no visible track record. 
As for open sea.ts ,  we can model the incumbent-contested vote by pooling district data 
across each of two decades. Par is now conceptualized a.s Par for the incumbent party 
rather than for the Democrats. The incumbent's recent vote appeal is measured a.s the 
incumbent's "Net Vote" in the previous election . The Net vote is simply the incumbent's 
vote percent minus Par for the particular election .The lagged Net Vote (LNV) represents 
the net attractiveness of the two major party candidates in the prior elect ion ,  relative 
to the normal vote and e lection trend. Incumbents ' Net Vote almost always i s  positive, 
indicating that incumbents are better than average candidates . But the Net Vote also 
reflects the chal lenger's appeal as well .  In roughly equa.l amounts, the lagged Net Vote 
(LNV) reflects both the ghost vote appeal of the fai led prior challenger, usually replaced , 
and the incumbent's vote appeal , which is usually quite stahle .3 
Much of the unexplained variance in the current vote is the contribution of the new 
challenger. We estimate current challenger qual i ty only crudely, using Jacobson's dichoto­
mous measure, whether he or she held prior pol it ical office. S ince we have no measure 
of prior office for challengers i n  1990, the year 1990 is omitted from our i ncumbent race 
analysis. Another consideration for omitt ing 1990 is some modest evidence of an ac­
tual decline ( not en d )  to the i ncumbency advantage in 1990, compared to earlier yea.rs. 
Results for 1990 may be less clearly generalizable. 
We also control for t ime trends of i ncumbent success by inclusion of a. simple l inear 
t ime trend in the incumbent share of the vote. \Vh i le it is well known that incumbent's 
have enjoyed steadi ly larger average margins  of victory, it  is also known that they have 
spent steadily more as \\'el l .  while average challenger spending levels have been nearly 
constant .  Contro l l i ng for a t ime trend. i ndependently of expenditure, allows us to a.t least 
partial ly separate out incu mbency spending advantages from changes in other factors that 
might affect margi n of \' ict ory. 
Table 2 presen t s our OLS results .  Six equations a.re presented : \Ve analyze veteran
incumbent races and freshman races sepa rately. For ea.ch type of race, we present resul ts
separately by drcade and also wi th the two decades-worth of data pooled together. 
Notably, Table 2 shows some OLS coefficients for incumbent spending with the correct 
sign but none statistica l ly sign ificant.  This is the typical pattern found. We obtain nearly 
significant incumbent-spending effect for freshman incumbents . Sti l l ,  when the data. are 
broken down even to the level of decade, results a.re spotty. For veteran incumbents, 
spending has the right sign in  the 1970s but not the 1980s. 
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We measure a strong time trend i n  the margin of v ictory. On. average, incumbents
receive roughly � of a percentage point more i n  each congressional election beginning
i n  1972 , controlling for trends in  other variables such as average spending levels. But 
these numbers should be interpreted with caution ,  since they are OLS estimates. As  we 
will see later, these coefficients diminish substantially as we correct for problems of OLS 
(such as simultaneity bias ) .  
The details o f  this instabil ity are unimportant ,  however, because all OLS est imates 
are so clearly b iased . Our task is to i mprove on the OLS estimates. Note also that even 
when Table 2 presents significant coefficients for incu mbent spending, the asymmetry of 
estimated effects for i ncumbents and challengers remains.  
3 2SLS Analysis of Spending for Incumbent Seats 
Given our data for the 1970s and the 1980s, we can replicate Green and Krasno's two­
stage least squares analy:-;is on a much larger <lat.a set . L ike Green and Krasno, we use 
the incumbent 's lagged expendi tures as the instrument for current i ncumbent spending. 
Table 3 presents these results. The first three columns include the same independent
variables as in the O LS equations. Column 1 is for the 1970s, column 2 is for the 1980s, 
column 3 for the pooled 1970s- 1980s data set .
These 2SLS est i mates present a striking contra.st to the OLS results .  For the 2SLS 
analysis ,  the coefficients for incumbent spending approach those for challenger spending 
and are stat ist ically significant. R emarkably, t he 2SLS equations using lagged incumbent 
spending actually explains more variance in the incumbent vote t han do t he comparable 
OLS equation using c urrent incumbent spending. It should be noted that the incumbent 
spending coefficients approach the challenger spending coefficients despi te the handicap 
of an uneven playing field. While t he IE coefficient is the presumably unbiased 2SLS 
est imate, the CE coefficic>nt is  st i l l  the biased OLS est imate that exaggerates the negative 
effect of chal lengN spendi ng. 
St i l l ,  the I\ra.sno-Grecn speci fication has its own weaknesses. The bas ic problem is 
that there i s  s imul t aneit y b<'t \\'een three variables-vote, incumbent spending, challenger
spending-not only t \\'O \·ar iables .  Our basi c  point i n  this paper is that ,  because of this ,
what is  ne<'df'd i s  a tl11H-«/Uaiion system which l inks together these three endogenous
variables .  The 2S LS approach is better than nothing, but ignores the strategic interaction 
bet ween challeng<'r and i n cumbent spend ing. 
There are many reasons why challenger spending should be an endogenous var iable, 
some of which arc> qu i t e  subtk. For example, j ust as current i ncumbent spending is 
affected by the cu rrent cam paign , so too the lagged incumbent spending i s  a function 
of the dynamics of t h<' JH'e\· ious campaign. Abramowi tz suggests that t he i nstrument 
of lagged spend ing present s a subtle source of bias in favor of i ncumbent spending, due 
to challenger effects . His argument i s  that incumbent spending at t ime t -1  reflects the 
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strength of the t- 1 challenge. For i nstance, a strong challenger a .t t - 1  provokes i ncumbent 
spending whi le also suppress ing the lagged vote for the incumbent . When the qual i ty of 
the challenge reverts to its normal strength (as an expectation ) at t ime t ,  the incumbent 's 
vote also reverts to normal The resul t  is that incumbents would gain over their lagged 
vote when lagged spending is h igh , even if their spending h as no effect . 
This problem can be i llustrated by the simple i nclusion of two additional variables into 
the equation-whether the prior challenger held elected office and the prior challenger's 
logged spending. These two variables offer indirect indicators of the strength of the 
prior challenger's campaign. N ote what happens to the 2SLS est imates of the incumbent 
spending coefficients w hen these two new variables enter t he equation . The coefficients 
for incumbent spending decl ine dramat ically both i n  terms of magni tude and statistical 
significance. The t ime trend,  which was i nsignificant (but the right sign ) before, is now 
significant ,  although smaller i n  magni tude than the OLS estimate. Meanwhi le, as re­
flectors of lagged challenger quali ty, lagged challenger spending show posi t ive significant 
coefficients. With the previous vote ( as the lagged Net Vote ) held constant,  prior chal­
lenger strength means a h igher current  vote percent for the incumbent .  These variations 
on Green and K ras no 's 2SLS theme do not necessarily mean that incumbent spending is 
a weak electoral force. The problem may lie deep within the underlying stat ist ical model . 
It may simply be that lagged i n cu mbent spend ing i s  not a proper i nstrument for current 
spending .  Moreover, i t  is li kely the case that cont inued search for a s imple answer i n  the 
form of new instrumental vari ables would  be futile .  
4 The Heat of the Campaign 
As a further i llustration of the i ncomplete specification of the vote- spending relationship ,  
we i ntroduce a variable wh ich at lea.st pa.rti a .lly accounts for the joi ntly determined levels 
of i ncumbent and challenger spending.  A well-known feature of the spending data is that 
incumbent and challenger spending tend to track each other. There are many plausible 
explanations for th is. For example, as we will see later on, a s imple game theoretic  model 
of spending pred icts tha t  i ncumbent spendi ng and chal lenger spending should be h ighly 
correlated, simply because ( i n  game-theory j argon ) their reaction functions are upward 
sloping: the closer t lw elect ion is ant ic ipated to be, then the more you should spend .  A
sim i lar logic holds for you r opponent, thereby induci ng a correlation i n  spending patterns. 
The presence of u nohscr\'C'd ,·a ria .hies indicating vulnerabi l i ty of the incumbent points i n  
the same direction . C'halle 1 1 gf'rs mount bigger campaigns when incumbents are weak a.ncl 
the chances of ousting thc-iuc.umhe.nt .a.re-relatively 1.a.rge.. h1cumbent$ spend to defend
themselves from such at tacks.  
Thus, campaigns can be arrayed on a dimension corresponding to how heated they 
are, and closeness of the outcome should be signi ficantly related to how hotly contested 
the race is. A natural measure for the heat of the campaign is the tot.a.I amount  spent by 
the two candidates . \1Vi ll t lw heat of the campaign tend to help the incumbent ,  help the 
. challenger, or have a neutral effect? We argue that for both statistical and substant ive 
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reasons , we should be able to measure a clear effect of heat t hat favors the challenger. 
S tatist ically, this follows from the left-out vari ables relat ing to incumbent vulnerabi l­
i ty. S ince heated campaigns are l ikely to be correlated with (unobserved ) incumbent
vulnerabi l i ty, omission of the "heat" variable wil l  tend to b ias the effect of i ncumbent 
spending downward and bias the effect of challenger spending upward.  Second ,  even 
holding vulnerabi l i ty constant ,  there are reasons to believe t hat challengers benefit and 
incumbents suffer from a spending race. Chal lengers need a big race to overcome the 
name-recogni tion problem and to get their message out. Even an incumbent 's defensive 
spending may have some residua.I value to a. relatively unknown challenger, for whom 
bad press may be better than no press at all .  A h igh-vis ibi l i ty campaign might also 
be interpreted by some voters a.s a signal that "something must be wrong" with the 
i ncumbent. 
As a rough cut a.t accounting for this myriad of effects,  which to a. large extent 
i nvolve the joint determinat ion of incumbent a.ncl challenger spending, we include a. "heat" 
variable: log of total spend ing. The results a.re shown in Ta.hie 4 .  The variable is 
significant ,  with the expect.eel sign: hotter races h urt  incumbents . But more i mportant , 
this heat variable changes the coefficients on incumbent spending a.nd challenger spending 
in rather drama.tic  ways, and leads to est imates that would seem to belie any paradoxical 
relationship between incumbent spending and the vote. 
There is further evidence that this is  not just an art ifact .  The result is actually 
qui te robust to specification.  For example, recall that the Green-Krasno estimates were 
obtained by arb i trari ly adding $5000 of spending for both candidates . \i\Tithout this ad 
hoc correct ion , the est imates for i ncumbent spending are very weak, almost l i ke the OLS 
estimates. However, i f  one controls for the heat of  the campaign , then the a.cl hoc cor­
rect ion is not needed t .o get the large incumbent spending effect . In fact , if anything, 
correction with the Green-Kra.sno constant waters clown both the i ncumbent spending 
effect a.nd the "heat-of-the-campaign" effect .  vVe report the results of the heat equations 
with and wi thout the G reen-Kra.sno correction in Table 4. That table also shows that
regardless of whether the Green-Kra.sno adj ustment is used , the inclusion of the total 
spending var iable essent ially null ifies any effect of the instrumental variable approach on 
the est imates . \i\Th i le the  R-squa.re does go up with the inclusion of the instrument.a.I vari­
able (a somewhat unusual phenomenon ) ,  the magnitude of the coefficient on incumbent 
spending actually goes do\\'1 1 .  What we have clone above goes further than 2SLS in the 
d i rect ion of correcting for simu ltaneity problems, but fai ls  to do i t  in  the context of a 
carefully specified tlire<' equat ion model that expl ic i tly l inks vote with the two spending 
variables . Could t lwr<' b<' another stat ist ical approach? Actually, we have ignored an 
import.ant aspect of om data. V../e do have r ich instruments for est imating the reverse 
effect-of the vote on spending. In the next section, we use esti mates of the effects of 
the vote on spending a� leverage for our relationship of interest-the effect of spending 
on the vote. 
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5 Estimation by the Uncorrelated Errors Assump­
tion 
The great frustration to est i mating spending effects is the scarcity of plausible i nstru­
ments for the spending variab les. But this approach of using "exclusion restrictions" to 
identify a simultaneous system is not the only available alternative. A different method 
of indentification p laces restrictions on the covariances of the residuals ( Hausman and 
Taylor, 1 983 ) .  
I n  this section, we uti lize a zero-covariance restriction for the disturbance terms or, 
simply, "uncorrelated errors . "  The zero covariance refers to the assumed lack of correla­
tion across the residuals i n  the structural equations. This is permits i dentification of the 
3-equation system . 
This solution of identification via zero covarian ce among disturbance terms of en­
dogenous variables is discussed i n  advanced treatments of the ident ification problem 
(e .g . ,  Fisher, 1 966, chapters :3, 4; Rothenberg, 1 973 , chapters 4-5) and gets mention i n
most econometric texts. (e .g . , Goldberger, 199 1 :  361-2;  Johnston , 1 963 : 248-9; Maddala, 
1 977: 226-8; Mal invaud ,  1 966: 528-38; See also Heise, 1 975: 1 81 -2  and Hanuchek and 
Jackson,  1 977: 271 -6. For a pol it ical science example, see Erikson,  1 982 . ) Applied to our 
problem, the key assumpt ions a.re that the disturbance terms for incumbent spending 
and challenger spending are each uncorrelated wi th the disturbance term for the vote 
division-in other words that there a.re no unmeasured sources of spurious correlation 
between spending a.ncl the vote. The plausible assumption that spending is largely a. 
function of the anficipatul vote is turned from a. research ha.ndica .p to a source of ana­
lytical leverage. While every variable that affects the vote is a. l ikely cause of spending
levels ,  the effect on spending presumably is indirect via. the vote. 1\1eamvhi le ,  unmeasured 
variables that might afff'ct spending directly are not l ikely to a f ect the vote directly. 
Figure 2 presents a si mple schematic view or, "causal model" u nderlying our discus­
sion. Certain exogenous \'cll'iables-Par, the Incumbent's Lagged Net Vote, and whether 
the current challenger held e lected office4 are used to predict the incumbent 's vote per­
cen t. . Only indirect I�" do t hcse variables affect candidate spendi ng . l\1eamvhi le spending
and the vote are r<'c iprocally related. The stronger the incumbent's  (anticipated ) vote, 
the less the spending b�· <>it her challenger or incumbent. Challenger spend ing hurts the 
incumbent. vote, \\'liile incumbent spending helps. The figure also notes the possibi l i ty 
of additional sources of co\ ·ar iance between the two spending variables besides the (an­
ticipated ) vote. l11cumlw11t and chal lenger spending could correlate, for instance, due to 
variation in the local medi a markets which affect the efficiency with which candidates can 
translates money into \'Otes. But the model assumes that the incurnbent 's vote does not 
corre late with the t \\'O s1wnding rnria.bles except. via the two feedback process of votes 
and spending on each other. 
The model sho\\'n in F igme 2 allows for the easy est imation of the effect of the vote 
on spending. The coefficients are (roughly) the ratios the exogenous variables' indirect 
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effects on  spending to their direct effects on the vote. Note that these estimates do 
not i nclude i nformation regarding the correlation or covariance between spending and 
the vote. The spending-vote correlations represent some combination of the effect of 
anti cipated vote on spending plus effects of spendi ng on the vote p lus a smal l  portion 
due to the correlation of spending disturbance terms. The uncorrelated errors assumption 
allows us to work backward to estimate the spending-on-votes effects from the variables '  
correlat ions (or covariances) and the reverse vote-on-spending effects.  
The ful l  set of est imates for the model were obtained via max imum l ikelihood tech­
n iques , using the simultaneous equation program EQS. The results are shown in Table 5. 
Qui te similar estimates a.re obtained for the 1 970s ,  the 1 980s , and the pooled sample. 
The coefficients for spending effects present a reversal of the OLS results .  For veteran 
races, incumbent spending affects the vote with a statist ically signifi cant coefficient of .
about 3 . 0; challenger spending affects the vote weakly with a. small i nsignificant coefficient 
of about -0 .5. For freshman races , the estimated effects a.re even more a.symmetrical , 
with a. coefficient that approaches double digits for incumbents and an insignificant pos­
i t ive coefficient (wrong sign ) for cha .l lengers . Meanwhile, we see that the ( anticipated) 
vote is a .  powerful influence on spending by incumbents (whether freshman or veterans) 
and,  especially, by chal engers. 
Table 5 also informs us about the relationship between spending trends and margin of 
victory trends over the two-decade span studied here. \�Te estimate no significant "t ime 
effect" on incumbent \'Ote margins,  but highly signi ficant time trends in the incumbent 
spending equation. This suggests that the observed increases in  incu mbency advantage 
over the last two decades can be attributed a.lmost entirely to h igher levels of incumbent 
spending (n .b .  cha l lenger spending has stayed nearly constant ) .  This is  consistent with 
the 2SLS results (Ta ble :3. column :3).
Since the models of Table 5 a.re overidenti fied (due to the multipl ici ty of vote pre­
dictors ) ,  the fit of the observed covariances to their predicted va.lues provides a test of 
the overall fit of each model in Table 5. These tests a.re best understood in  terms of 
the fit when cova riances are standardized to correlations . For all the models of Table 5, 
the mean (absolute)  res idua I correlation (predi cted minus actua .l for the unconstrained 
correlations only ) was a m ere .02 .  �'h i le a y2 test reveals that even these low values
show up as statis t i ca l ly  sign ificant for the veteran equations (difficul t  to a .void with the 
large .N's ) ,  the frpshman <'q1 1at ions are al l non-significant. In general , the low residua .I
correla t ions mean that t l i<' tota l effects of the vote predictors (Par , LNV, Prior Office,
and ti me) correlate wi lh the .speudi.n.g ..:lla .ria.bles .in .. the-.p.roporiions ex.pected , given their
correlations wi th the incumbent vote. 
Why does the uncorrela ted errors solut ion give such asymmetric coefficients for the 
two spending variables'? To provide some intui t ion ,  consider a. s impl ified presentation 
where t he exogenous variables are col lapsed into a. single variable ,  )(-the predi cted vote 
based on the three instruments (par, net.lag, prior office ) ,  excluding the time t rend .  Now, 
with only four variables, we examine the connection between the observed correlations 
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and the est imated paths. For the ful l  sample of veteran i ncumbent races, F igure 3a shows 
the correlations among X, IV, IE, and CE. Figure 3b shows the resul tant standardized
"pat h  coefficients . "5 
In standardized form, the estimated effect of the vote on a the two spending  variables 
are ratios of correlations: 
A 1'[E,X 
PIE,IV = -- = - . 529 ;
r1v,x 
A rcE,X 
PCE,IV = -- = -.779 
r1v,x 
With the paths from the vote to spending so eas i ly est imated,  the estimated paths 
of interest from the spending to the vote are, as a rough approximation, the difference 
between the path coefficient and the correlation coefficient . The IV - IE correlation 
is far less negative ( -.36.5) than i f  the sole source were the estim ated -.528 path from 
IV to IE. The ML solution accounts for this difference wi th a pos i t ive pos it ive effect 
(standardized path = + .205) of IE on IV. Meanwhi le ,  the IV - CE correlation of -. 750 
is about the s ize expected from the estimated - . 779 path from IV to CE a.lone, leav ing 
l it t le room for a. reverse CE on IV effect . 
Note how we obtai n a pos it ive estimated effect of i ncumbent spending on the incu m­
bent vote and a much mi lder negative effect of challenger spending on the vote .  The 
residual IE - IV correla tion is posi t ive once the 2SLS estimate of IV on IE is  taken 
into account .  The obvious inference is that a posit ive effect of IE on IV is responsible, 
although as wi th al l correlation or covariance evidence, spur iousness ( correlated errors) 
is also a poss ib i l i ty. The residual CE - IV correlation is about the magni tude expected 
from the 2SLS est imatP of the IV on CE effect. This suggests only a m inor effect of CE 
on IV, or a major effect masked by significant suppressor var iables ( correlated errors) .  
Possibly the main lesson from this exercise i s  the demonstration that the stat ist ically 
dominant effects are from the ( ant icipated) vote to spending. The substantively impor­
tant effects of spending on t he vote are almost drowned by the stronger causal currents 
from anticipated vote to spending.  Assuming we now have the correct model , we can 
account for the dispar ity between the uncorrelated errors and O LS fin dings as clue a 
massive pair  of voti ng on s 1wndi ng effects that on ly the uncorrelated errors solution can 
adequately measure. 
These new resu l t s  df'pa rt from the OLS est imates to a degree that is unsett l ing.  Our 
new es t imates say that  i ncumbent spending matters but chal lenger spend ing does not . 
Is this resu l t . any more bel iPvable than the opposi te OLS resu l t . that challenger spending 
matters but incumbent spending does not? While we may h ave shift.eel the burden of 
statist i cal proof i n  favor of i ncumbent spendi ng, the val idity of our new estimates depend 
on the accuracy of the ident ifying assumptions.  It  is imperative to cri t ical ly evaluate the 
plausib i l i ty of the uncorrelated errors assumption that ident ified the full set of equations 
of the simultaneous equations model ; and we must also examine  the features of the 
s imultaneous equations model i tself. 
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First, is the uncorrelated errors assumption plausible? It might appear that our 
reach for the uncorrelated errors solution is nothing more than a desperate lunge for 
any statistical assumption that gives answers without regard to plausibility. In fact, the 
uncorrelated errors assumption is very plausible theory in the context of our substantive 
discussion. Consider that the assumption would be violated if some unmeasured vari­
able( s) were causing both incumbent spending and pro-incumbent voting and/or both 
challenger spending and pro-incumbent voting independent of the effects of votes and 
spending on each other. A positive IE - IV residual correlation would exaggerate the 
IE on IV effect; a positive CE - JV residual correlation would mute the CE-on-IV 
effect. Spending certainly responds to omitted district-level variables but are such vari­
ables also related to voting for the incumbent. Omitted spending variables might be 
indirectly related to the partisan vote via some connection with district income, educa­
tion, or urbanism. But any such connections would be expected to work in one direction 
for Democratic-held districts and the opposite for Republican-held districts. It seems un­
likely that variables that contribute to candidate spending and the vote for incumbents of 
one pa.rticular party would also contribute substantially to the vote of incumbents of the 
opposite political party. To the extent such variables exist, their effects would probably 
be slight. 
What then about. the simultaneity assumptions themselves? Just as one ca.n argue 
that OLS analysis of thf' vote equation ignores the candidates' responsiveness to the 
unmeasured causes of the vote, one can also argue that the uncorrelated errors solution 
gives candidates too much credit for anticipating perturbations of the vote a.rising from 
variables that the analyst docs not measure. The question is: how much does candidate 
spending respond to intangible vote sources that we analysts are unable to incorporate 
in our models? Suppose that the individual candidate's perception of the vote is: 
!Ve= IV+ uc (1) 
where uc represents a random disturbance term. This contrasts with the analyst's equa­
tion: 
( 2 )  
where J\-'A represents th<' rnte foreseeable from measurable variables such as Par (par­
tisanship plus nation al trend). the Lagged Net Vote (prior deviation from Par), whether 
thf' challenger held J>r<'\'ious office, plus incumbent. spending and challenger spending, and 
UA represents ti)(' 1111ohs<'l'\'<'d component, mainly the overall quality -0f the challenger's
campaign plus any de,·iat ion of the Incumbent 's vote appeal from that inferable from the 
incumbent 's recent track record. Transposed, 
(3) 
Suppose candidates see 11 .. 1 less clearly than they do the' more visible J\r A: 
l .J 
IV c = IV A - bcuA + uc
where be lies between 0 and 1 .  If be is zero, then the OLS estimate of the spending 
effect on the vote is unbiased as there is no simultaneity problem. If be is 1.0, then the 
uncorrelated error estimate of the spending effect on the vote is unbiased. For values of 
be between these extremes, the spending coefficients will be between the extremes of the 
OLS and uncorrelated errors estimates. 
We cannot directly estimate the coefficient be (or uc, which is of peripheral interest). 
But for any assumed value of be we can estimate the two coefficients representing spending 
effects on the vote. The various projections are shown in Figure 4. Of particular interest 
is the value of be that generates equal coefficients for incumbent spending and .challenger 
spending. This point6 is where be is .64. In other words, if candidates can anticipate the
analyst's error term with a.t lea.st sixty-four percent of the a.ccura.cy that they anticipate 
tangible sources, then incumbent spending has just as much effect on the vote as does 
spending by challengers. \iVith be set to 0.64, the vote equation is:
IV = 1.65 (IE) 
(7.65) 
-1.65 (CE) 
(7.65) 
+.88 (Par) 
(32.38) 
+.55 (LNV) 
(24.17) 
-3.59 (PO) 
(-9.28) 
+0.08 (Year) 
(2.06) 
The mean absolute residual correlation for this model supports its plausibility. 
One could also allow be to va.ry by type of candidate. The most plausible variation 
is a higher be for incumbents than challengers, since incumbents are arguably better 
equipped to sense intangible sources of the vote. The statistical implications are as 
follows: For incumbents, the higher the assumed be , the stronger the estimated effect 
of incumbent spending; but for challengers, the higher the assumed be, the milder the 
estimated effect of challenger spending. Thus, assuming a be ga.p atigments both the IE 
and CE coefficients. For inst.a.nee, in the extreme where be equals 1 . 00 for incumbent but 
0.00 for their challengers. both (veteran) coefficients are strong: 3 .92 for IC and -5. 17 for
CE. 
One can go a step further and find the be values that deliver IE and CE coefficients 
that match the coefficients for open seat candidate spending. In Table 1, the estimated 
effects of open seat ca11didat<" spending cluster in the range of 4.0. Estimated (veteran)
coefficients of 4.0 and -·LO for IE and CE can be obtained by assuming be values of
1.00 for IE and 0 . 23 for CE. \�Te might be tempted to accept these estimates because
of their plausibility, but unfortunately they provide a poor fit with the data, with a 
mean (absolute value) residual correlation of . 09 .  In genera.I, the greater the be gap we 
hypothesize, the worse the fit-suggesting that we are imposing an incorrect model. 
Obviously we have not exhausted the direct.ions for statistical investigation. For in­
stance, we can vary the assumed covariance of the disturbance term. As a sensitivity 
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analysis, we explored some alternative identifying restrictions besides the standard zero 
covariance restriction. The concern is the possibility of a delicate knife-edge assump­
tion, with even slight deviations from zero covariance tilting estimates in new directions. 
Happily, this fear turned out to be unfounded. We moved the IE-IV and CE-IV residual 
correlations as far from zero as + or - .20,  while imposing the standard assumption that 
be = 1 .00. While the magnitudes of the coefficients changed slightly (as would be ex­
pected), we consistently found that incumbent spending effects were greater in magnitude 
than challenger spending effects. 
As a further robustness check, we can exclude some variables from the vote equations 
or assume that certain predictors to the vote equation affect spending directly. For 
example, there is a case for deleting Lagged Net Vote from the analysis entirely, on the 
grounds that it incorporates spending effects from the previous election.7 Doing so raises 
both spending effects slightly. 
To summarize this section, identification of the set of simultaneous equations with the 
help of the uncorrelated errors method leads to the inference that incumbent spending 
matters a lot, as much if not more than challenger spending. T he analysis also suggests 
very powerful effects of anticipated vote on spending decisions. With this in mind, we 
next examine in more detail how the anticipated vote influences spending decisions. 
6 Using Game Theory to Estimate Spending Equa­
tions 
While the uncorrelated errors model goes a long way toward sorting out the simultaneity 
problem, the details of the strategic interaction between the two competing candidates 
is left unmodelled. \Ve do this below, by modifying some assumptions of that model 
regarding how the candidates form their expectations about the probability of winning 
as a function of how much t hey and thei r opponent spends. 
The basic game theory model is a very simple 2-person spending game between an 
incumbent (!) and a challenger (C). Both candidates find winning valuable and wish to 
maximize the probability of winning. The probability of winning is determined by the 
usual suspects: district characteristics, short-term forces, candidate characteristics, cam­
paign spending, and chance. Treating the first three categories of variables as exogenously 
fixed, we summarize t he effects of campaign spending and cha.nee by a. simple function, 
P ,  which denotes -the inrnmhent's ·probability of ·wim1ing a.s a function of incumbent
expenditures and challenger expenditures. 
Raising campaign resources is costly to the candidates. A similar idea is explored 
by Ansolabehere ( 1 990 ) .  Promises must be ma.de, issue positions must be compromised, 
and (perhaps worst of all) seemingly endless, boring, fundraisers must be attended. This 
formally represented by cost functions for the incumbent and the challenger. These 
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two functions might be different, reflecting cost advantages, scale economies, and other 
differences in fundraising costs that might exists between incumbents and challengers. 
The formal structure is a game between I and C, which we analyze in the N ormal
form. The game consists .of three parts, the set of players, the strategy sets for each 
player, and the payoff functions. 
I =  { 1 ,  2}  the set of players, ( Incumbent = 1 ,  Cha.llenger = 2 )  
S1 = S2 = ?R+ the strategy sets (Non-negative campaign expenditures) 
U1 : S1 x S2 --+ ?R } p ff f . 
u: . S S 1n 
a.yo unct10ns 
C ·  1 X  2 --+ :n 
We assume that the payoff functions for i depend on the value of winning, 11£ , the
probability of the incu m bent winning as a function of how much each candidate spends, 
P(  S1 , S2 ) , and the cost of candidate i of spending 81 on the campaign.
U1 (5'1 , 5'2 ) 
U2 ( S1 ,  S'2 ) 
Vi P(S1 , S2 ) - C1 (S'i ) 
Vi ( l  - P(S1 , S2 ) ) - C2 ( S2 )
We also assume on P and C are twice continuously differentiable, Cf > 0,  Cf' > 0,  
1 . C"( S· )  - D P  0 a p  0 1/ 82 P - C" 0 - 1;, 82 P - C" 0 Tl t' s, �� , , - oo ,  as1 > , ,'is2 < , I Ci Sf · 1  < , 2 asg 1 < . 1ese assmnp 10ns
guarantee that the spending level ("best response" ) of a candidate to the opponent's
campaign spending level is always unique. 
An equilibrium is a pair of spending levels, S" = ( S; ,  5'2 ) such that:
.5'1" E arg max U1 (S1 , S2* )  S1 2:0 
.5'2 E arg �1�� U2 ( Sj ,  5'2 )
2 _  
I t  i s  easy to  show t l iat a \ash equilibrium i s  characterized by the following.
For the incumbent ( i = I ) : 
( ) eo. - 0 · r  \/ ;:i p ( 0  .:..·· ) C'' ( O ) < 0a .:J I I . I ;:i.;,· • ' 2 - I -. ·· I 
(b) Si > 0 is the unique so l u tion to Vi .. �'�: (Sj , .5'2 ) - C� ( S'j ) = 0 
if Vi i�  ( O , S:i )  - C� ( O )  > 0 .
Similarly for the challenger :  
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(a) s; = o if Vi tJ: (s; , o) - CHO) s o
(b) s; > O is the u nique solution to Vi :J: (S; , s; ) - C�(S2 )  = O 
if -Vi t£ (S; ,  0 )  - C� (O )  > 0 .
In other words, there are two possible kinds of equilibria., the first where at least one 
candidate spends nothing and the second where b�th candidates spend strictly positive 
amounts. In the latter kind of equilibrium, ea.ch candidate spends up to the point at 
which the expected value of an extra. dollar spent on the campaign (±Vi;�) equals the
marginal cost of raising that extra dollar (Ci ) .  
We obtain a para.metric, estimable form of the above equations by assuming that 
fundra.ising costs are quadratic in the log of spending, for all spending above some level 
of "free spending. '' That is, on average, candidates come into the campaign with some 
amount of money- in-hand ( such as an incumbent's war chest or party money for the 
challenger), so, the cost. functions look like: 
�](I ( IE - F1 ) 2�Kc( CE - Fc) 2
where S1 is rewritten as IE and 52 is rewritten as CE.
Differences in the free-money para.meters ( Fr and Fe ) and the cost para.meters (Kr 
and f(c ) reflect differences between incumbents and challengers in their fundraising costs.
Given this specification, the marginal cost function on the left hand side of equations 4 
and .5 become: 
MC1 ( I  E )  
JI Cc ( CE)  
I\1 ( !  E - F1 ) 
I\c ( CE - Fe ) 
The specification of t lw  P( · ) function provides the linkage between the vote equation 
and the two spendi ng equat ions .  The vote equation is a reduced form specification 
of the t echnological relationship between spending and votes, controlling for whatever
exogenous variables might he relevant. As  is apparent from the earlier sections, there are 
a variety of ways to obtain a reduced form specification. Here, we use the basic Green­
Kra.sno 2SLS model of the vote equation ( Table 3 ,  Column 3 ) ,  excluding the heat-of-­
the-campaign variable and lagged challenger variables. ( S imilar estimates are obtained 
under the other model specifications . )  Predicted values from the equation provide an 
instrumental variable meas me of the candidates 1 anticipated vote. The assumption is 
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that candidates' estimated IEc as actual IE plus a disturbance u c .  We use our estimate
IEA as an instrument for unobserved IEc . The assumption that the candidates believe
the actual vote to be their predicted vote IE p lus a Normally distributed error term
gives us a parametric estimate of the probability of winning as a function of spending . 
Formally, we can write this estimated probability of winning function in the following 
way: 
( I11 - 50 )
p = cf> 
(J' 
Where cf> is the unit Normal CDF and Ill is a function of spending and exogenous
variables. N ote that this estimated probability of winning function has an additional 
parameter, O' ,  which corresponds to the candidates' beliefs a.bout the error of the an­
ticipated vote, IV. In the analysis and the estimation below, we assume that O' is the
same for all candidates, and select value of O' that provides the best fit of the spending 
equations. 
This specification of t.he probability of winning function, yields a closed form solution 
to the left hand side of equations 4 and .5 ( the same for both candidates) by partially
differentiating this probabili ty of winning function by IE and CE, respectively. This
gives us: 
f\' ( IE - F )  = _j}J_ -+- ( 11'-so)I I V2IT" 'I' a ( 4') 
( 5')
where /h and /3c are the coefficients on incumbent and challenger spending, respectively, 
from the vote equation. Rearranging terms gives two equations, which a.re linear in the 
estimated Normal density e\·aluated at fl/ - 50 ( a  variable we ca.II DENS), plus a constant
term, and nonlinear in a- :  
CE = Fe - a, . .  cI> ( fr-so ).,;2;ah c  " 
( 4") 
( .5") 
These two equations indicate that, for a. given value of O' ,  we can recover estimates of the 
cost parameters by running a. regression between DENS and IE and ( separately) between
DENS and CE. From these, together >vit.h t.he estimates of the direct effect of spending
on votes obtained from the reduced form vote equation, we can then back out estimates 
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t he cost parameters, K1 and f(c , and the free-money parameters, F1 and Fe . \Ve also 
include in t hese regressions a t ime trend for both the constant term and the coefficient 
on DENS, denoted t and t* DEN S ,  respectively. \Ve do this for a grid of values of O', 
and obtain an est imate of O' as the value that provides the best fitting regressions. The 
results of the two-step estimation procedure are reported in Table 6 .  
There are a t  least seven notable features o f  these est imates .  First , incu mbents come 
i n  with much more free money than challengers do. Second ,  the challenger spending 
equation fits better than the incumbent 's equation (R2 of . 8 1  compared to .40 ) .  Third,
the best-fitti ng value of O' is  1 3 ,  which is higher than the standard error of the regression 
which produced the values of predicted vote. Fourth, when spending matters the most 
(JV = 50) ,  predicted spending by challengers and incumbents are nearly equal. Fifth,
the incumbents' quadratic cost parameter is estimated to be significantly h igher than 
the challengers' cost paramf't.er ( .028 vs . .  0 1 6 ) .  These cost parameters are backed out 
from the est imates of the DENS coefficients, together with the estimates of /h and f3c
from Table 3 ,  column  :3 . Sixth,  there is no measurable t ime trend in challenger free 
money, but there i s  a h ighly significant t ime trend in  the coeffi cient on D ENS . This 
may reflect lower marginal costs of rais ing money for challenger, and also bears out the 
observation by Jacobson that challengers , considered as a group ,  a.re much more careful 
targeting big spending campaigns where they are most l i kely to yield a v ictory. The fi nal 
observation about Table 6 is that the t ime trend for incumbents is  different from that for 
the challengers. There is a massive shift i n  i ncumbent free money, representing a more
than fourfold i ncrease from $:3 1 ,000 i n  1 974 to $ 1 27,000 in 1 988, perhaps reflecting larger 
cash balances carried o\·er across campaigns. But there is no change in the responsiveness 
of incumbents to the anticipated closeness of the race since the coefficient on t*DENS is 
not signi ficantly d ifferent from 0.  
These findings are la rgely consistent with conventional wisdom, with the possible 
exception of the fifth one. On the surface of i t ,  that finding suggests that m arginal cost 
of raising money increases much more steeply for incumbents than for challengers. O ne 
possible explanation for t h is might be that i ncumbents, by vi rtue of already having a 
lot of money to st.art \\' i t  h .  have pretty much exhausted their cheap sources of campaign 
fi nanc ing,  while many chalkngers, starting from noth i ng. in i t ially have relatively easy 
access to ''cheap rnoney" from disgruntled contributors that are outside the i ncumbent 's 
core consti tuency. I IoWP\'f' I' this story is not very believable. l\fore likely is that our 
current specifi c  a t  ion of t lw spending equations, simple as it is, is  still missing some key
determ inants of i nn tm lH'n l  spending. 
A scatter-plot .Qf spe1 1d i 1ig . .  a.ncl-prwlicted · ·\'Gt.e...sheds--.sGrHe +ight-on what might be
missing from the i n cumbent  spend ing equation . In figure 5a,  one can see the very close 
fit of chal lenger spend ing t o  the DENS transformation of predicted vote. Figure 5b, 
the corresponding graph  using incumbent spending, looks much different. Particularly 
str ik ing is the inelast ic i ty  of incumbent spending with respect to the anticipated closeness 
of the election . There are se\·eral di rect. ions to look for an explanation for this .  This may 
reflect the fact tha t  many incumbents spend heavily even i n  comfortable reelection years, 
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possibly to scare off future challengers , and possib ly because of overstuffed war chests. 
It  may also reflect heavy spending in response to a strong challenge in the primaries , a 
p henomenon that presumably occurs more often in "safe" d istricts. Another possibil ity 
i s  that t he cost/payoff functions are not specified correctly. In particular, costs ma.y 
decrease (an d  the value of winning increase) in the probabi l i ty of victory. Contributors 
prefer to give money to winners ; likely winners have a long "life expectancy," so winning 
is  more valuab le for them. In any event ,  all this points to the need to look at the dynamic 
strategic  incentives of i ncumbents much more carefully ( as ,  for example in  Goldenberg, 
et al . ,  1 986) ,  and to look at more elaborate specifications of t he cost/payoff functions of 
the candidates, someth ing we plan to take up in future research . 
7 Strategic Interactions and Nonlinearities 
The results from the previous section iud ica.tes that for strategic reasons t he effect of 
(antici pated ) vote on spending is nonlinear. This is reflected in the shape of the scatter 
plots i n  figure .5. In both marginal and ( very ) safe di stricts, the relationship between 
anticipated vote and spend ing is small ( the slope is close to 0 ) .  In intermediate districts, 
we find spending is most responsive to anticipated vote, for both incumbents and chal­
lengers . As the margi nal impact of the vote on logged spending varies, so does the bias 
of the OLS  estimate of the reverse effect of spending on the vote. Where the vote margin 
has the strongest effect on spending as an endogenous variable, the greater should be 
the bias in  the OLS estimates of the spending variables . The worst OLS est imates of 
spend ing effects should be for intermediate districts. The lea.st a.mount of bias should
show up where the vote is competi tive or very sa.fe .8 
To test this  hypothesis. we measured the m arginal ity-safety of the expected vote 
margin from an OLS regression of the vote for veteran incumbents on the usual  exogenous 
variables ( exc ludi ng spen d i n g ) :  Par, the Lagged Net Vote, and whether the challenger had 
served in prior office. Usi ng t h i s  index, we d ivided the expected vote for the incumbent at 
broad in tervals ,  w i t. h  cut  points of .52%,  57%, 62%, 61%, 72% ,  17%, 82% ,  87%, a.nd 92%. 
Within each inte1Ta l .  we rnn a separate OLS regression, precl i ct. ing vote as a function
of spending only. The n's t t lt.s a.re sho\\'n in Table 7. For very competit ive districts
( < 52%)  the coeffic ient est i m ates on the spend ing va.riables are a.lmost indi stinguishable
from the est imates from 2SLS . As we move into less competit ive di stricts, there i s  a. 
monotonic depart u re from t he 2SLS es t imates . Incum bent spending seems to be less 
important. This lends fu rt her support that incumbent spending matters, this time for 
a select group of com pct.i Li \·c districts u:>ing .c.onw��tic>nal .QLS .esti rna.tes .  Of  course, i t
is these marginal d is tr i c t s \\' here the  effect of  spending (or policies to  l imi t  spending) i s  
decisi ve on outcomes. 
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8 Spending and Incumbency 
At this writ ing, Congress is  considering campaign spending reform that would i n  some 
fashi on reduce the overall level of campaign spending while increasing the equi ty of 
incumbent and challenger spending levels. One goal that underlines this reform effort i s  
the reduction o f  incumbents' electoral advantage. In this section, w e  briefly address how 
our research may contr ibute to evaluating the consequences of spending reform. 
Whether reform would actually help to level the playing field of incumbent vs . chal­
lenger competi tion depends on the relative efficiency with which incumbents and chal­
lengers win votes from spending dollars. If, as poli t ical science orthodoxy has i t ,  only 
spending by challengers matters very much, then the incumbents ' electoral advantage 
comes from other sources . If only challengers gain much from spend ing, then incumbents 
must have an even larger advantage before spending is taken i nto account..  If so, general 
l imits on spending would a.ctua.lly hurt  challengers more than i ncumbents. 
But suppose that incumbent spending and cha.llenger spending are at parity in terms 
of their effects on the vote. Or  suppose that incumbent spending matters even more 
than challenger spending. At least the former and quite possibly the latter seem l ikely 
from our analysis. \Vhat are the implications for understanding the i ncumbents'  electoral 
advantage and for possible spending reform? 
Suppose equal effects of incumbent and challenger spending. \i\Ti th equal effectiveness 
for incumbent and challenger spending, the edge goes to the candidate who spends the 
most .  In most instances , this is  the incumbent rather than the challenger. On average, 
incumbents spend about one logged unit of thousand dollars more than their challengers. 
From our est imates ,  t h is spending gap could account for a.bout two percentage points of 
the vote out of a net incumbency advantage of a.bout 7 points .9 However, this spending 
gap is concentrated main ly in  safe sea.ts where i t  goes largely wasted. In races that a.re 
otherwise competi tive, challengers already approximate the incumbent's level of spending. 
Thus, any reform t hat crea t es pari ty in incumbent a nd challenger spending would affect 
wins and losses main ly by augmenting the sl im chances of likely losers. 
But  suppose a larger effect for incumbent than challenger spending.10 Incumbents 
would gain both from s1w11cl ing more and spending more effectively. Assuming the esti­
mates of Table :J are correc t ,  the spending aclvantag0 by incumbents would fully account
for the incumbency advantage. [Subtract out all effects of spending and incumbents
would on average perform l i t tle better than Par, and no better than new ( pre-incumbent )  
wi nners do  comparf'd to Par.] 
Next, consider the i mpl ications of reform i f  incumbent spending is more effective 
than chal lenger spending. 1 1  With less spendi ng mak ing i ncumbents less visible ,  their 
vote would revert. toward a party line vote. Their fat.e would be determined more by the 
factors beyond their control that com prise our Par measure-district partisanship  plus 
short-term forces . Severe spending l imits could induce the defeat of popular i ncumbents 
who currently depend on heavy spending to overcome adverse district partisanship .  Cha.I-
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lenger victories, while more frequent , would not reflect the triumph of the challengers' 
"personal vote" so much as short-run partisan forces working against marginal i ncum­
bents .  
While this paper has argued that incumbent spending matters at  least as much as 
challenger spending, i ts evidence does not all ow a confident statement regarding whether 
i ncumbent spending matters even more than challenger spending. The precise answer 
of the relative effects of i ncumbent and challenger spending is clearly i mportant for 
understanding why incumbents generally win and also for i ts implication for reform of 
the campaign spending game. 
9 Conclusions 
The paper is an attempt. to take a fresh look at the relationships between incumbent 
spending, challenger spend ing, and the vote by attempting to incorporate strategic ele­
ments into the statistical models. Our interest was motivated by widespread skepticism 
about and puzzl ing evidence concerning the impact of incumbent spending on the vote. 
The results here lead us to a tentative conclusion. \Ve have presented a variety of evi­
dence, using diverse stat ist ical approaches, that point to significant and large effects of 
incumbent spendi ng,  ri va l l ing and perhaps surpassing the effects of cha.l lenger spending.  
We have also lookPd at  the rPverse effect of anticipated vote on spending and found that 
a stat istical model based on the spending game between i ncumbents and challengers ac­
counts very wel l  for cha l lenger spending, and generates some new questions about the 
determinants of i ncumbent. spend ing. I t. seems c lear that further progress in  this direction 
necessi tates the use of models that can disentangle very severe simultaneity problems . I t  
is equal ly c lear that there are many thorny issues that need to be looked at more deeply, 
but in the same spirit as here, by incorporating i nto the statistical models strategic 
elements of congressional  campaigning. 
Table 1 
Predicting the Open Seat Vote from District 
Presidential Voting, 
the Election Year, and Candidate Spending: 
Northern Districts 1 972- 1990 
( 1) (2) 
Dependent Var. = 
% Democrat 1972-80 
Log of Dern. 3.15 
Spending ( 4.41) 
Log of Rep. -4.61 t
Spending (-6.98) 
Log Dern.Spending 3.97* 
minus Log Rep. Spend (6.90) 
Dern. Pres. Vote, 1976 0.74* 0.77* 
(11.00) (12.00) 
Dern. Pres. Vote, 1988 
Election Year 
1974 8.2ot 8.34* 
(5.53) (6.90) 
1976 6.73* 6.96* 
(4 .3.5 )  ( 4.47) 
1978 3 .87 2.40 
( 1.82) (1.53) 
1980 1 .68 1.47
( 1.61) ( 1.61) 
Constant 12 .5.5t 10.04 t 
( 3 .21 ) (:3 .10)
Adj usted R squared .791  .788 
Standard err. of est .  .5 .94 .5 .99 
N umber of cases ( 168 ) (168)
1984 
1986 
1988 
1990 
(3) . (4) 
1982-90 
4.16 
(6.39) 
-4.89* 
(-2.10) 
4.50* 
(8.28) 
0.49* o.50*
(6.19) (6.53) 
-3.89* -4.22* 
(-1.96) (-2.17) 
-1.43 -2.00 
(-0. 76) (-1.22) 
-2.28 -2.85 
(-1.12) (-1.47) 
-0.51 -1.33 
(-0.25) (-0.73) 
38.54* -28.95* 
(3.53) (-7.32) 
.783 .784 
6.00 5.99 
(102) (102) 
Notes : Log of Dem . Spend ing,  Log of Rep .  Spending = N atural Log of Candi-
date Spending p lus $5,000; all in  constant. (1978) dol lars.
T-values in parentheses. * = Signif. at .05 ; t = .01 , t = .001.
"Boxed components of equations = "Par" for the decade.
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Table 2 
OLS Esti1nates of Spending Effects 
on the Incun1bent 's Vote Percentage 
Veterans Freshmen 
Pooled 
197 4-80 1982-88 70s ,80s 1 974-80 1 982-88 
Log of Incumbent 0.43 -0 .41  -0 .06 1 .28 0 .44 
Spending ( 1 . 1 6 )  ( - 1 . 22 )  (-0 .23 )  ( 1 .26 ) ( 1 . 33 )  
Log of  Challenger -4 . 52t -2. 1st -3 .. 59t - .5 .  l St -3 .31  t 
Spending ( - 1 9 . 1 5 )  ( - 1 5 . 1 8 )  ( -23 .85 ) ( - 1 1 . 05 )  ( -5 .84 )  
P ar 0.561 0 .791 0 . 631 0 .42t o .86t
( 1 7 . 93 )  ( 1 7 . 74 )  ( 26 . 1 0 )  ( 4 .93)  (.5 .89)  
Lagged Net Vote 0 .36t 0 . :301 Q , :37t 0 ,331 0 .06 
( 1 1 .00 )  ( 12 . 46 )  ( 1 6 . 72)  ( 4 . 1 2 )  ( 0 . 48 )  
Challenger 's - 0 . 77 - l .86t - 1 . 1 91 -2 .00* - 1 .27 
P rior Office ( - 1 . 49 )  ( - :3 . 57 )  ( - 3 . 72 ) ( -2 .04)  ( - 1 . 1 0 )  
Time Q ,34t 0 .25* o .20t 0 .28 0 .7 1  t 
( 3 . 46 )  ( 2 .82 ) ( 7 . 1 1 ) ( 1 . 27)  ( 2 . 67 )  
Intercept 7 1 . 051 .5 1 . 65t 63 .901 so . .  55t 40 .. 59* 
( 1 4 . 1 4 )  ( 1 0 .03 )  ( 1 7 . 9 1 ) ( 6 .26 )  ( 2 .2 1 ) 
Adj usted R2 . 7.54 . HO . 744 . 658 . 741 
Stand .  err. of Est . 5 . cl :3 4 . . 55 .5 . 1 1 5 . 9 1  4 .90 
Number of Cases (705 ) , (612)  p.31-7 ) .( HJ2 ) - (9D )  
Pooled 
70s ,80s 
1 .20 
( 1 .42 )  
-4 .63t 
(- 1 2 .50 ) 
0 .49t 
( 6 . 67 )  
a . mt
( 3 . 08 )  
- 1 . 84 * 
( -2 .3.5)
0 . 1 .5 
( 1 .43 )  
72.40t 
( 6 .81 ) 
. 660 
5 .79 
( 282) 
Note: Log of Dem . Spending. Log of Rep . Spending = Natural Log of Candidate 
Spend ing plus $.5 ,000; all in constant ( 1 978) dollars. 
T- values in  parentheses . "' = Sign i f. at .05; t= .01 . 1 = .00 1 .  
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Table 3 
2SLS Estin1ates of Spending Effects 
on Veteran Incun1bents'  Vote Percentage 
Pooled Pooled 
1 974-80 1 982-88 70s,80s 1 974-80 1 982-88 70s,80s 
Log of Incumbent 3 .41  + i . .50+ 2.48+ 1 .27* 0.59 0 .85* 
S pending ( 5 .  75 ) ( 3 . 84 )  ( 6 .02 )  (2 .3.5 )  ( 1 .22) ( 2 .30 )  
Log of  Chal lenger -5 .29+ -3 . 1 3+ -4. 1 3+ -4.94+ -3 . 18+  -4 .01  + 
Spending ( -20 .22) ( - 1 5 .93 )  ( -25 . 1 3 )  ( - 19 .87 )  ( - 16 .43)  (-25 .37 )  
Par 0 .6 1  + 0 .84+ 0 .69+ 0 . 10+ 0 .92+ 0 . 76+ 
( 1 9 .26 )  ( 18 .45 )  ( 27 . .54 ) ( 20 .7 1 ) ( 19 . 1 6 )  (29 .28)  
Lagged Net Vote 0 . :39+ 0 ,39+ 0 .40+ 0 .50+ 0 .50+ 0 .52+ 
( 1 2 . 1 2 )  ( 1 3 . 1 6 )  ( 18 .09 ) ( 1 4 . 32)  ( 1 3 .85 )  ( 20 .4 1 ) 
Chal lenger's - 1 .04 * -2 . 14+  - 1 .48+ - 1 .08* -1 .9o+ - 1 . 36+ 
P rior Office ( - 2 .05 )  ( -4 . 1 0 )  ( - :3 .99 )  ( -2 . 1 6 )  ( -3 .  7 1 ) ( -3 .75)  
Lagged Log of 1 .8:3+ 1 .20+ i .54+ 
Chal l .  S pending ( 7 . 79 ) ( 5 .67 )  {9 .68)  
Lagged Chal l .  0 .46 -0 .08 0 . 24 
Prior Office ( 0 . 9-1 ) ( -0 . 1 7 )  (0 .  70 ) 
Time 0 . 1 1  0 . 1 :3 0 .06 0 .27t -0 . 12 0 . 1 5+ 
( 1 . 1 0 )  ( 1 . :34 ) ( 1 . :36 ) ( 2 . 6 1 )  ( - 1 . 25 )  {3  . .  5 1 ) 
I n tercept 4 :3 , :32+ :3 i . 24 + :38 .20+ :38 .  75+ 24 ,35+ 33 .66+ 
( 6 . 6 1 ) . ( 4 . 60 )  (8 .0:3 )  ( .5 .80)  ( :3 .47)  (9 . 68 )  
Adj us t ed R2 . 765 . 7.1:3 . 75 1  . 778 . 753 . 764 
Standard e r r .  of Est . G . :32  4 .53 5 .05 5 . 1 7  4 . 37 4 .92 
Number of cas('s ( 702) ( 6 1 2 )  ( 1 3H ) ( 702) ( 6 1 2) ( 1 3 1 4 )  
Note: Log of Dem.  Spend ing,  Log of  Rep .  Spend ing = Natural Log of Candidate 
Spending plus $5,000: all in constant ( 1978 ) dollars. 
T-values in  parentheses . "' = Sign i f. at .05; t= .0 1 ,  + = . 001 . 
2G 
Log of Incumbent 
Spending 
Log of Chal lenger 
Spending 
Par 
Lagged Net Vote 
C h al lenger's 
� Prior Office
Time 
Intercept
Log Total Spending 
A dj usted R2 
S EE 
\ N
Table 4 
Effects of Total Spending 
Green-Krasno adjustment 
( +$5,000) 
OLS 2SLS 
-0 .06 2.24 2 .48 4.08 
( - 0 .2:3 )  ( 2 . 6 1 ) ( 6 .02 ) ( 8 . 2 1 ) 
- :3 . .59 - 2 .86 -4. 1 3  - 3 . 6 1  
( - ')'J Sr.: ) - · . :) ( -9 .69)  ( -2.5. 1 3 )  ( - 1 9. :34 ) 
0 .63 0 .63 0.69 0.68 
( 26. 1 0 )  ( 26.07 ) ( 27.54 )  ( '7'" .. 6 )... I .  I 
0 . 37 0 . 37 0 .40 0 .40 
( 1 6 . 72 )  ( 1 6 . 74 )  ( 1 8.09)  ( 1 8.26 )  
- 1 . 1 9  - 1 . 1 9 - 1 .48 - 1 .48 
( - 3 .  72 ) ( -3 .22 )  ( -3.99 ) ( -4.03 ) 
0 .26 0 •) .. . ... / 0.06 0.07 
( 7 . 1 1 )  ( 7  .29)  ( 0.36 )  ( 1 . .54 ) 
63 .90 65. 7 1  38. 20t 39.9.5 
( 1 7 . 9 1 ) ( 1 8 . 1 8 ) ( 8 . 0 3 )  ( 8 . 38 )  
- :3 . 0 1 -2 . 1 :3 
( - 2 .86)  ( - .5 .62)  
. 7 -t -t  . 746 . 7 5 1  . 757 
.5 . 1 1  5 . 1 0  .5 . 0.5 4 . 99 
1 :3 I 7 1 :3 1 7  1 :3 1 4  1 :3 1 4  
Note: T-values in  parenthesis .  Veteran incumbent races only. 
'r
_ ,
No Adjustment 
( +$ 1 )  
OLS 2SLS 
- 1 .03 2.60 1 .27 4. 1 4  
( - 1 4.0 1 ) ( 7.06 )  ( 3. 13 )  (9.85) 
- 1 . 03 -0.43 -0.88 -0.62 
( -4. 75 ) ( -7 .20) ( - 1 5. 08 )  ( - 1 0 .93 ) 
0 .73 0 .61  0 . 8 1  0.76 
( 27.02 ) ( 25.56) ( 27.43) (27.68 ) 
0.47 0.41 0.52 0.48 
( 1 9.36)  ( 1 7.43) ( 20.32) ( 20.00) 
-2 .47 - 1 . 7 1  - 3.03 -2.49 
( -5.98 ) ( -4.49) ( - 7 . 1 7) ( -6.34) 
0.27 0.36 0.05 0.36 
( 6 .62)  9.33 ) ( 0.99) (7.7 1 ) 
39 .28 68.89 1 0. 23 3 1 .49 
( 3 .30 )  ( 1 7.85 ) ( 1 .88 ) ( 6.04) 
- .5 .96 -4 . .  52 
( - 1 2.9.5 )  ( - 1 5 .06 ) 
. 667 . 7 1 3  . 673 .721  
.s . 7.5 5 .41  5 .79 5.34 
1 :3 1 7  1 3 1 7  1 3 1 4  1 3 1 4  
·1able 5
Uncorrelated Error Estimates of Spending Equations 
Veteran Incumbents, 1 970s: 
I E = -.04*IV + . I O*T + e· ' S.E.E. = .62
(-15.77) ( 9. 1 1 )  
CE = - . lO*IV + .06*T + e; S.E.E.  = . 76 
(-29.57) ( 4.30) 
IV= 3.56*IE + 1 2*CE + 1 . 04 *Par + .75*LNV -3.97*PO - . 1 7*T + e· ' S.E.E = 7.62 
(5.25) ( .23) ( 17 .21 ) ( 1 4.08) (-5.44) (-1 . 1 2 )  
x2 = 1 7.48, d.f. = 4 ,  P = .002, I r  - f l = .02
Veteran Incumbents, 1 980s: 
IE = -.05*1V + .o8*T + e· ' S.E.E. = .58
(-13.28 )  ( 6. 94 )  
CE = - . l l *IV + .02*T + e;  S.E.E. = .74
(-20.39) ( 1 .31 ) 
IV= 2. 1 7*IE -.37*CE + 1 . l O*Par + .58*LNV -5.00*PO + .06*T + e· ' S.E.E. = 5.65 
(3.92) (- 1 . 1 4 )  ( 1 6.95) ( 1 4 .69) (-7.82) ( .48) 
x2 = 30.26, d .f. = 4 ,  P < .001,  I r  - fl  = .02
Veteran Incumbents, Pooled 1 970s, 1 980s: 
IE = -.04*1V + .09*T + e· ' S . E.E. = .60
(-20.86) ( 25 .87) 
CE = - . l O* IV + .03 + e· I S.E.E.  = .83 
(-34 . 1 7) (5.93)  
IV = 2 .98*IE - . 16*CE + 1 .01 *Par + .68*LNV -4.4l * PO + -.05*T + e· ' S.E.E. = 6.57 
(6.68) (- .56) (24.83) (20.50) (-8.97) (-.8 1 )  
x2 = 45.74, d.f. = 4 ,  P < .00 1 ,  Ir - f l = . 02 
Freshman Incumbents, 1 970s: 
IE = -.04*IV + 0.09*T + e· ' S.E.E.  = .49 
(-6.34) ( 4 . 62 )  
CE = - . l O*IV + -0.00*T e· ' S.E.E. = .78 
(-10.25) (-0.06) 
IV = 7.73*IE -0.70*CE + .98*Par + 0 .55*LNV -4.63*PO + .30*T + e· I S.E.E = 8 .05
(3.05) (-0.54 )  (6.02) ( 4.06) (-3.05 ) ( . 85) 
x2 = 3.95,  d.f. = 4 ,  P = .41,  Ir - f l  = .01
Freshman Incumbents, 1 980s: 
IE = - .05*1V + 0 . 1 4 *T e; S.E.E.  = .49 
(-7.24 ) (5 .66)  
CE = - . 14*1V + . l O*T e· I S . E. E. = . 90 
(- 10.85)  (2 .38)  
IV = 7.81 *IE + .62*CE + l .O l *Par + .59*LNV -3.37*PO + . 1 4 *T + e; S . E . E  = 7.72
(2.71 ) ( .-46 ) (5.'.M ) � 3.il5) (-1 .77) ( . 3 1 )  
x2 = 8.99, d.f. = 4 ,  P = .06, I r  - f l  = .oa
Freshman Incumbents, Pooled 1 970s, 1 980s: 
IE = -.04*IV + .09*T + e· ' S . E.E.  = . 50 
(-9.68) ( 1 2.30) 
CE = - . 1 1  *IV + .03*T + e; S.E.E.  = .84
(-14.97) (2.84) 
IV = 9.2l *IE + .29*CE + 1 .29*Par + .65*LNV -4.76*PO + -.58*T e· ' S.E.E = 9.49 
( 4 . 1 1 )  ( . 20) (7.24) ( 5.48) (-3.49) (-2.58) 
x2 = 3.o6, d .f. = 4, P = .55, Ir - fl = .01
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Table 6 
Cost Est imates from Spending Equations 
Challengers Incumbents 
Constant 8.50 10 .48 
( 157 .6 )  ( 1 80 .2 )  
Dens 7.97 2 . 75 
( 35. 1 0 )  ( 1 1 . 29 )  
T - . 0 1  . 1 8  
( .97 )  ( 1 3 .9 1 )  
T* Dens . 5 1  - . 0 1  
( 9 . 1 6 )  ( .21 ) 
Adj usted R2 . 8 1  . 40 
Free r-. Ioney 1 974 0 :3 1 ,000 
Free Money 1 988 0 1 27,000 
Quadratic Cost . 0 16  .028 
Coe Ai cent
/V 1 3 1 4  1 :3 1 4  
Note: T-va lues i n  par<'n t l i eses. Free money estimates correspond to Fe and Fr. The
quadrat i c  cost coeffice11ts correspond to I<c and 1\.1 . The dependent variables a.re log of
cha l lenger spend i ng and  lo� of i nrnmbent spending ( us ing the $5000 correction ) .  
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Table 7 
OLS Estimates of Spending Effects for Pooled Veteran Sample, 
by Predicted Incu1nbent Vote Margin 
<52 52-57 57-62 62-67 . 68-72 72-77 77-82 
Log of Incumbent 4 .82t 2 .32t i . nt 0 .95* -0 .69 0 . 74 -0.80 
Spending (2 .88) (2 .77) (2 .89)  ( 1 .97)  ( - 1 .72)  ( 1 .57)  (- 1 . 0 1 )  
Log o f  Chal lenger -3 .99t -4.04+ -5 .03+ -4 . 14 +  -3 .34+ -3 .  73+ - 1 .84* 
Spending ( -3 . 1 1 ) ( -6 .86 ) ( - 12 .44 ) ( - 1 3 .67 ) ( - 12 .-JJ ) ( -9.2 1 ) ( -2 .39) 
Adjusted R2 .250 .282 .456 .388 .353 .314  .092 
Stan d .  Err. ·-1.18 5 . 1 1  5.26 5.49 .5 . 16 4 .66 4 .61 
of Est .  
N 32 120 2 1 0  331  329 18.5 82 
82-87 
-0.03 
(-0.03) 
-2.82 
( - 1 .58) 
.014  
3.76 
87 
Note: Log of D em .  Spendi ng. Log of Rep .  Spending = N atura.I Log of Candidate 
Spending plus $5,000: a l l  in  constant ( HHS)  doll ars. 
T-valu es i n  parentheses . "' = Signif. a.t .05 ;  t . 0 1 ; + . 001  
Predicted Incumbent Vot P  !\ l argin  from OLS Equation pred i ct ing Incumbent Vote from 
Par, Lagged Net Vote. Time. and Prior Office-for pooled Veteran Incumbents. 
:3 0  
87-92 
1 .53 
( 1 . 5 1 ) 
-0 .33  
(-5 .2) 
.022 
3 . 15 
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Fig . 4 .  Spend ing Effects by As sump t ions About Candidate Knowledge 
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Endnotes 
t This Working Paper replaces Working Paper 806 ( "The P uzzle of Incumbent Spend­
ing in Congressional Elections" ) .  
* We want to thank Donald Green , Gary Jacobson, Gary King, and David Romero
both for sharing their data. and for their valuable comments . We thank Frank Bau m­
gartner and Janet Box-Steffensmeier for comments on a. prel iminary version . The first 
author i s  grateful for the financial support of a grant from the Univers i ty of Houston 
P resident 's Research Enchancement Fund. Both authors a.re grateful for the support of 
NSF through grant #SES-9224787. The views expressed here in are not necessarily t hose 
of the National Science Foundation. 
1 .  O bviously there a.re many variations in  how we could measure Par .  For instance, 
we could ( as i n  Erikson , 1 900 ) disregard spending entirely for the measurement of Par .  
Of course we cou ld mod i fy the exact functional form of spending effects .  The practical 
consequences are minimal .  Besides control ling for d istrict partisanship  via. presidenti al 
voting, the most cruc ial consideration i s  the proper adj ustment of election-year effects .  
2 .  The president ial vote for other election yea.rs ( 1972, 1 980 for the 1 970; 1 984 for 
the 1 980s) does not add signi ficantly to the predict ion of the open seat vote within the 
decade. For the H JSOs , the 1 084 presidential vote could easi ly be substituted for t he 1 988 
vote. For northern dis t r icts ,  the two vote measures correlate a.t + . 97 .  
3 .  The lagged Net \'Ote represents a compos i te o f  the popularity o f  the  current in­
cumbent at t ime t- 1 minus the populari ty of the t.- 1 challenger. Lagged Net vote also 
absorbs some of the effects of spending at t.- 1 .  To the extent i ncumbent popularity i s  
autoregressi ve, lagged i ncu mbent populari ty ( I )  affects the i ncumbent's current popular­
i ty with an unkno\\' n coeffi c ient b\' 1 (of a. size that may approach 1 . 0 ) .  S tatist ically, the
observed coeffic ient for l agged net vote shou ld be:
· Var ( / )  b = bl\ '  J * -------, Var ( J ) + Va.r ( C )  
where I and C stand for i n cu mbent popularity and cha.l lenger popularity ( i n  vote units )
respect i vely. I f  hot h popular i ty variances are a.bout equal , then the observed b ought 
to be about ha.If of the au l.oregressive .coefficientior.1.he incmnbent's-p.opula.ri ty. The 
observed b is actua l ly  about . -1 0 ,  suggest ing a. strong autoregress ive component to lagged
Net vote. 
4. S t rictly speaking the prior offi ce variable is not t ru ly exogenous, since a. close race
attracts more qual i fied challengers , l ike prior office-holders . Omitt ing the prior office 
variable makes virtually no d ifference for the uncorrelated errors analysis .  
:J6 
5 . The correlations can be i nterpreted i n  terms of "path  equations" of the form :
Tij = Pii + °L, Pik1'ik 
where i is the independent variable, j is the dependent variable, and the !..: variables are
the other variables i n  the system. For example, with IV as the dependent variab le .
r1v,cE = P1v,cE + PJ\l, JETJE + Piv,xrx,cE 
Alternatively, with CE as the dependent variable, 
1'/V,C:E = PCE,IV + PCE,UcE 1'U(;E,IV 
For Figure 3,  these i denti ties fol low exactly, because the system of equations i s  exactly 
i dentified. The ful l  model ( Figure 2 ) ,  however, is  overident ified . 
6 .  For the Fresh man eq uation , the poi nt where the two spending effects are equalized 
( at +3 .35,  -3. 3.5 )  is a he of o . :34.  
7. Specifical ly, the potential problem with Lagged Net Vote is as follows. The i n­
cumbent 's ( stable )  taste for spending wi l l  repeat i n  successive elections .  Therefore, t - 1
taste for spend i ng wi l l  contribute to the t - 1 vote and also to incumbent spending at
time t ,  with further reverberations for challenger spending.  This d istorts the covariances
between LNV and contemporary spending, which enter into the estimates of the IE and
CE effects. Wi t.h  LNV exc luded ( an d  be = 0 .00 ) ,  the (veteran ) coefficients a.re 3 . 08 for
IE and -0. 75 for challengers .
8 .  This discussion ignores the possible increases i n  spending efficiency accompany­
ing reduced spend i ng, for example,  from red uced advert is ing rates for candidates who 
vol untari ly keep w i th in  new spending l imits .  
9 .  Strictly speak ing,  the advantage from i ncumbency per se  i s  the  share of  the vote 
gained stri ctly from bei ng the i ncumbent. I\fost of the incumbency advantage of a.bout 
7 percentage poi nts deri ves from a. gain in net \'Ole of G . 7  percentage poi nts between 
the fi rst win (as a no1 1 i n cu mbent ) and the fil 's t re('lect ion as a freshman incumbent . 
Fol low ing the freshman Y<"Cl l' . t he gain in t.he net. vote from one elect ion to the next slows
to 0 . 1 percentage poi n t s .
1 0 .  O u r  discussion col l servat ively assumes that spend ing effects are short-term rather 
than even part ia l ly rumu lo t  ive. If spending effects carry over from one election to the 
next , any i ncumbent edge from spending is  magn i fied even further. 
1 1 .  There is  on<' woy tha t. h igh spending can help chal lengers even when incumbent
spendi ng general ly is the more effect ive .  Spending by incumbents or challengers can 
magni fy the unpred ic tabi l i ty of voter responses , which gets reflected i n  an increased 
variance of the d i strict vote around i ts expectation . The result of i ncreased variance 
would be more elect ion upsets .  This may be partly captured in the heat variable. 
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